The battle of the narratives: How propaganda has taken centre-stage for Iran

By Rojina Parchizadeh

When an internet blackout blocked Iranian protestors from documenting and communicating the atrocities committed against them, two opposing camps swept in to fill the void. Iranian-Australian Rojina Parchizadeh explains why we must not let these narratives obscure the political agency of those on the ground.

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For almost three weeks, the Iranian government cut off 92 million people’s access to the global internet in one of the most extensive communications shutdowns in recent history. Iranians could not access VPNs or Starlink, nor could they make phone calls or send text messages.

One consequence of the shutdown is that it was incredibly difficult to verify information coming out of the country. There is, for example, a wide variation in reported death tolls. Iranian state authorities –notorious for underreporting deaths – state that 3,000 people have died during the protests. On the other hand, NGOs and reports from doctors inside Iran indicate that the death toll is closer to 30,000. Mei Sato, the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the Islamic Republic of Iran, has stated that the internet shutdown ‘hides the true scale of the killing’.

Different verification standards for death tolls across NGOs, efforts by state authorities to coerce families of the deceased to say that their family member was a state security force member, and the difficulties of getting in contact with those inside Iran, have all obscured the death toll. State authorities have reportedly sought to conceal the death toll by transporting bodies in ice-cream vans and meat trucks, burying the deceased without notice, and disappearing peoples’ bodies.

Apart from state repression, narrative dispossession was another consequence of the internet shutdown. At a pivotal moment, Iranians were unable to document and communicate what was happening to them. In that void, other actors coopted the narrative.

Two narratives have been particularly influential. One seeks to delegitimise the protests by framing criticism of the Iranian government as US or Israeli propaganda. The other portrays the protests as a unified call for the return of the monarchy.

Both narratives, however, ultimately erase Iranian political agency. By failing to centre the diversity of voices of those inside Iran, these narratives reduce Iranians to a monolith. Iranians are reduced to either: a population whose repression must be tolerated to ‘resist’ foreign interference, or a people yearning for the return of the monarchy.

Why accusations of foreign intervention gain traction

Scepticism towards foreign intervention in Iran is not irrational, given the history of the country and wider region. In the current case, however, this scepticism has been redirected away from foreign governments and towards Iranian protestors themselves.

This scepticism has resulted in two dominant claims. First, some argue that the protests were instigated by foreign intelligence agencies such as Mossad. Variations of this claim allege that either Mossad agents initiated the protests, armed protestors, or were responsible for killing Iranians to inflate casualty figures. This explanation mirrors the Iranian regime’s own justification for its brutal crackdown on protestors.

Second, many commentators hesitate to discuss the Iranian regimes’ crimes, fearing that discussion will legitimise foreign intervention. In practice, these commentators have treated Iranian peoples’ suffering as secondary to their own geopolitical anxieties.

Several factors explain the high traction of these claims: the legacy of regime-change wars in the region, the long history of foreign interference in Iran, the hypocrisy of some of Iran’s loudest critics, and the Iranian regime’s investment in information operations designed to sway Western thought.

Foreign intervention and decreased public confidence in institutions

For many people in the West, scepticism towards humanitarian justifications for foreign intervention is shaped by recent history. The US’ invasion of Iraq was premised on false claims about ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (WMDs). The war resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians, the displacement of millions and regional destabilisation. No one was held accountable for the false claims that bolstered support for the Iraq war.

The Iraq war eroded trust in Western governments and institutions. That lack of trust towards government institutions shapes how people interpret events in Iran today. Yet, mistrust of Western powers cannot be used to justify silence about the oppression of Iranian people.

The history of foreign interference in Iran

Iran’s modern history is tainted by repeated foreign intervention that undermined domestic democratic projects. These interventions were not one-off events; they were features of imperial competition in Iran.

The 1906 Constitutional Revolution is one example. In 1906, thousands of Iranian protestors had gathered at the British Embassy, demanding the formation of a parliament. The Shah eventually relented and decreed a constitution into law, empowering Majlis (i.e. Parliament) to legislate.

The constitution allowed Iranians to establish a representative government through Majlis, and placed limits on the Shah’s power. This project, however, was quickly undermined by Russia and Britain. Russia, with British backing, issued an ultimatum to the Iranian Majlis that would undermine the country’s independence. When the Majlis refused, Russian troops entered Northern Iran, killed the leading constitutionalists in the country, and forced the dissolution of Majlis.

In 1921, Britain supported a military coup led by Reza Khan, a Cossack Brigade officer. Reza Khan seized control over Tehran and consolidated power as Minister of War with British support. By 1925, Reza Khan deposed the Qajar dynasty and had himself crowned the new Shah, founding the Pahlavi dynasty. Reza Khan modernised Iran, but he also centralised power and suppressed political dissent, ethnic minorities, and those advocating for constitutionalism.

This authoritarian sentiment was only reinforced in 1953, when the CIA and MI6 orchestrated a coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh.

Mossadegh had nationalised Iran’s oil industry and sought to revive constitutional governance. For background, before nationalisation, the British obtained most of Iran’s oil revenue through the ‘Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’ (now known as BP). Iran only received 16% of the net profits from the sale of its oil, and no Iranian was permitted access to the books to verify the figures. Iranian workers of the company were destitute, earning 50 cents per day, while British workers lived lavish lives. After the coup, the Shah reversed the nationalisation of oil and strengthened monarchical absolutism.

Evidently, the Iranian people’s aspirations to establish a democracy is an unfinished project dating back to 1906. Several powers – British, Russian and American – have at various points interfered in Iran’s domestic politics for their own interests.

Opportunistic voices exploiting Iran

One of the reasons why the public is hesitant to recognise the atrocities in Iran is the voices talking about it. Alongside Iranian activists and human rights organisations, actors with deeply compromised records have invoked Iranian peoples’ suffering to advance their agendas.

When someone like Benjamin Netanyahu – a person that the International Criminal Court has issued an arrest warrant for – condemns ‘the mass killings of innocent civilians’ in Iran, it contaminates the movement. Given Israel’s ongoing genocide against Palestinians in Gaza, Netanyahu’s statements are cynical and disingenuous, reinforcing suspicion about Iranian protestors.

The suspicion intensified on 29 December 2025, when the Mossad’s Farsi-language X account posted: ‘Come out to the streets together. The time has come. We are with you. Not just from afar and in words. We are with you in the field as well’. Shortly after, Mike Pompeo tweeted: ‘Happy New Year to every Iranian on the streets. Also to every Mossad agent walking beside them…’

I saw the immediate impact of these tweets. Many commentators, including progressives, dismissed the protest movement as ‘Mossad-instigated’. It became increasingly difficult to discuss the Iranian regime’s crimes without first disproving espionage claims. The Iranian people’s testimony was treated as a suspect point that needs to be interrogated.

Whether Mossad operates inside Iran is beside the point. Intelligence agencies operate globally. The issue is that the possibility of foreign interference has been weaponised by both the regime and external commentators to justify mass arrests, executions and enforced disappearances. Following the twelve-day Iran-Israel war, for example, Iranian security forces arrested approximately 21,000 people on espionage charges. These narratives are not neutral; they are used to justify repression.

Additionally, I saw no one ask: Why would the Mossad post this?

I saw no one question: Why would an intelligence agency undermine the fundamental pillar of secrecy which is essential to its own operations?

Accepting the regime’s framing

Over the past two decades, the Iranian regime has invested heavily in information operations aimed at ‘strengthening the regime’s image and standing and undermining the internal resilience of its adversaries.’ These efforts not only rely on state media, but on influencing policymakers, journalists and audiences abroad through intermediaries perceived as independent.

In Washington, the National Iranian American Council (NIAC) has played a significant role in shaping debates around Iran. It consistently prioritises engagement and sanctions relief while opposing accountability mechanisms for state violence. Trita Parsi, NIAC’s founder, described his vision for the organisation in these terms:

“Although the mission of the proposed lobby should be to improve relations between the US and Iran and open up opportunities for trade, the initial targets should be less controversial issues such as visas and racial profiling/discrimination.”

In recent years, several individuals associated with NIAC have gained prominence through their advocacy for Palestine, leading Western commentators to treat them as credible progressive voices. During the Iranian protests, however, NIAC affiliates were either silent or actively promoted claims that protestors were foreign agents. NIAC affiliates include Assal Rad, Hamid Dabashi, Trita Parsi, Narges Bajoghli, Hoda Katebi, Sina Toossi, and Sahar Nowrouzzadeh. Meanwhile, respected journalists such as Mehdi Hasan and Owen Jones frequently platformed NIAC affiliates.

The Iranian regime has also cultivated relationships with influencers and self-described independent journalists. Over the past few weeks, for example, @naleybynature has been pushing the narrative that the protests in Iran are foreign-instigated. She did not mention that in July 2025, the Iranian regime invited her and other influencers to visit Iran and attend a 4-day government-run conference about the Iran-Israel war. When these figures reproduce regime-aligned narratives, audiences unfamiliar with Iran’s information operations absorb state narratives without realising.

Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, has also allured Western leftists by utilising anti-imperialist language when criticising the US’s interference in Iranian affairs. Khamenei has never condemned Russian imperialism despite Russia’s prolonged imperial history in Iran. In fact, Khamenei views Russia as one of Iran’s key allies. By utilising anti-imperialist language, state authorities in Iran have gained support from the West.

The dangers of the foreign interference narrative

Scepticism towards foreign intervention is understandable. In the case of Iran, however, that scepticism is increasingly redirected from states and towards Iranian people themselves.

Commentators interrogate the narratives of Iranian protestors more aggressively than those belonging to Iranian officials. Commentators scrutinise chants from the protests rather than the executions that follow. They reframe the Iranian regime’s repression as ‘manufactured unrest’, treating repression as the regime’s reaction to unforeseen circumstances rather than the state’s policy in the face of dissent. The policy of mass murder is not new in Iran – it was carried out in the 2017, 2019, and 2022-23 protests, and it is being carried out again.

Ironically, commentators who describe themselves as anti-imperialists have been the most guilty of reproducing a colonial gaze. They have fit Iranian protestors into what scholar Shahram Khosravi describes as ‘predetermined categories of victimhood and false consciousness,’ where Iranians are framed as objects incapable of judging what is good for them. While these commentators claim to care about the well-being of the Iranian people, they consistently speak over them unless those voices fit the narrative they seek to reproduce. Khosravi argues that this discourse denies Iranians political agency by refusing to see them as anything other than geopolitical instruments of the US or Israel. Iranians’ grievances become secondary to geopolitical analysis.

When an individual explains state violence through foreign interference, they shift responsibility away from the perpetrator. Mass killings, executions, and enforced disappearances are reframed as unfortunate but understandable responses to foreign provocation. In framing the situation this way, commentators inadvertently empower the state apparatus to carry out more mass killings and executions.

The Iranian peoples’ long-term struggle for democratic governance is forgotten. As Iranian progressives have warned: “anti-imperialism that cannot listen to those living under oppression turns into another form of domination.”

The myth of a unified Iranian diaspora

The international media has amplified the narrative that all Iranians seek the return of the monarchy. However, this is not true.

Like any population, Iranians hold a wide range of political views. Contrary to popular perception, Iranians are not all Persians, and they are not all Shia Muslims. Iranian society includes other ethnic groups such as Kurds, Balochs, Lurs, Arabs, Azeris, Turkmen, and Armenians. It includes other religious groups such as Jews, Christians, Sunni Muslims, Bahais, and Zoroastrians. Considering the ethnic and religious diversity in Iran, it is natural that people with different backgrounds and experiences will have different political views. Most Iranians, however, are unified in wanting the Iranian regime gone.

Concerningly, some progressive voices are dehumanising Iranians because of the existence of right-wing and reactionary elements in the diaspora. What is omitted in this discussion is that all populations have right-wing and reactionary members. The existence of these reactionary elements within Iranian society does not diminish the legitimacy of resistance to state violence. It does not mean that the Iranian people who are victims of state violence deserve less solidarity.

When commentators sought to delegitimise the suffering of Palestinian people and deny them solidarity because of the actions of Hamas, we correctly recognised that it was wrong. The same principle applies here.

How to centre Iranians

To centre Iranians is not to deny the existence of other states’ geopolitical interests in Iran. Rather, centring Iranians means not treating their lives (or their deaths) as issues secondary to foreign intervention. It means acknowledging and demanding accountability for state crimes without providing excuses for the perpetrators.

It means recognising how internet shutdowns, surveillance, arrests, and executions systematically silence those inside of Iran, creating a vacuum that others exploit. Centring Iranians means refusing to delegitimise a movement because bad-faith actors seek to exploit it.

Above all, centring Iranians requires allocating responsibility for atrocities to those who wield power. Iranian resistance is not random. It is a response to the material conditions imposed by the Iranian state, not abstract geopolitical forces. Anything less erases Iranians’ long history of resistance against authoritarianism in all its forms.

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About the author

Rojina Parchizadeh

Rojina is an Iranian-Australian law and psychology student with a focus on international law and social justice. In 2024/25, she was a member of Macquarie University’s Jessup Team, one of three teams which represented Australia at the international rounds of the Philip C Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition. You can find more from Rojina on Instagram, where she regularly posts political content with her sister, Lily.